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Abstract 
The paper analyses whether, and to what extent, emerging market economies (EMEs) have 
systemic importance for global financial markets, above and beyond their influence 
during crises episodes. Using a novel database of exogenous economic and political shocks 
for 14 EMEs, we find that EME shocks not only have a statistically but also economically 
significant impact on global equity markets. The economic significance of EME shocks is in 
particular underlined by their remarkably persistent effects over time. Importantly, EMEs are 
found to influence global equity markets about just as much in “good” times as in “bad” 
times, i.e. during crises or periods of financial turbulence. Finally, we detect a large degree of 
heterogeneity in the transmission of EME shocks to individual countries’ equity markets, 
stressing the different degrees of financial exposure, which is relatively higher for European 
equity markets. 
 
JEL Codes: F36; F30; G15. 
Keywords: global financial markets; equity markets; transmission; financial integration; 
shocks; news; emerging market economies; mature economics; euro area; United States. 
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Non-technical summary 
Do emerging market economies (EMEs) matter for global and mature economies’ financial 
markets? There is a large literature showing that EMEs indeed exert a significant effect on 
global financial markets during financial crisis. However, there have been few major crises in 
emerging markets since 1998; yet at the same time, emerging markets’ assets have become 
an increasingly important global asset class over the past decade. Emerging markets have, 
moreover, developed into an ever more relevant driver of global economic growth. 
The paper asks whether, and to what extent, EMEs have systemic importance for 
global financial markets, above and beyond their influence during crises episodes. Such an 
analysis is complicated by an identification problem, i.e. the difficulty to distinguish financial 
market developments in emerging markets from those in mature economies. We use a novel 
database that identifies shocks that are truly idiosyncratic and specific to EMEs. These 
shocks comprise a set of economic and political events in 14 systemically relevant EMEs over 
the period 2000-2004 and are extracted from “exogenous” sources. More specifically, the 
database not only covers negative events that drive markets lower, but also “positive” news 
that e.g. indicate better than expected economic growth or the announcement of important 
economic reforms. 
Using daily data over the period 2000-2004, we analyze the transmission of these 
shocks from the 14 EMEs to 15 mature economies’ equity markets —covering the 12 euro 
area countries, the United States, Japan and the UK— plus global equity market returns, as 
well as the intra-regional and extra-regional spillover across EMEs. 
The empirical analysis yields a number of striking findings. Most importantly, 
we find that, on a daily frequency, EME shocks have a significant and sizeable effect, 
inducing on average a 0.3% change in global equity returns on the day a shock occurs, 
and rising to around 0.5% cumulated after 5 days. Second, our analysis shows that 
EME-specific shocks are so important overall for global equity returns that their effect is still 
statistically significant after several weeks. While it is difficult to quantify precisely the 
overall explanatory power of the EME shocks for global equity markets, in particular 
the persistence of the effects stresses the economic relevance and systemic importance 
of emerging markets for global equity markets. 
A third key finding of the paper is that global equity markets react almost as strongly 
to positive EME news as to negative news, with this result being robust across EMEs and 
over time. This underlines that EMEs matter for global financial markets not only during 
crises or other less favorable episodes, but that investors in mature economies also share 
the gains from positive developments in EMEs. Finally, there are a number of intriguing 
cross-country differences: although EME equity markets generally react more strongly 
to shocks in other EMEs of the same region, mature economies overall react mostly more 
strongly to EME shocks than emerging markets from other regions. 
Overall, the findings of the paper emphasize the emergence and relevance of EMEs 
for global and in particular mature economies’ financial markets. This is an important result, 
and constitutes the intended contribution of the paper to the literature, as it underlines that 
emerging markets can no longer be considered as a minor player in global financial markets 
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that matter only in times of crisis or financial market turbulence. Given the importance and 
ongoing increase of cross-border financial investment as a transmission channel and the 
rapid growth of EMEs as an asset class, the results suggest that EMEs are likely to continue 
becoming an even more important factor for the determination of global asset prices in 
the years to come. 
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1 Introduction 
Do emerging market economies (EMEs) matter for global and mature economies’ financial 
markets? The general perception is that EMEs are relevant for global financial markets mainly 
when they experience financial crises, thus inducing an abrupt portfolio rebalancing 
that also affects investment decisions and thus returns in markets of mature economies. 
In fact, there is a large literature focusing on and indeed finding evidence for the international 
transmission of EME shocks and for contagion during crises in emerging markets, foremost 
the Latin American crises of 1994-95 the Asian crisis of 1997-98 and the Russian default of 
August 1998 [see e.g. Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999), Baig and Goldfajn (1998), 
Rigobon (2002), Wongswan (2003)]. 
However, there have been no major crises in emerging markets since 1998 —apart 
from the Turkish and Argentine crises of 2000 and 2001, which arguably have had little 
systemic repercussions for global financial markets [Krueger (2002), Fischer (2002), and Hall 
and Taylor (2002)]. At the same time, emerging markets’ assets have become an increasingly 
important asset class over the past decade, in particular also for investors in mature 
economies including the United States and Europe. Emerging markets have, moreover, 
developed into an ever more relevant driver of global economic growth, as for instance much 
of global growth in the last few years being attributable to economies in Emerging Asia and 
also those in Latin America and Emerging Europe. 
The present paper asks whether, and to what extent, EMEs have systemic 
importance for global financial markets, above and beyond their influence during crises 
episodes. Such an analysis is complicated by an identification problem, i.e. the difficulty to 
distinguish financial market developments in emerging markets from those in mature 
economies. We use a novel database of shocks that are truly idiosyncratic and specific 
to EMEs. These shocks comprise a set of economic and political events in 14 systemically 
relevant EMEs over the period 2000-2004. They are based on and extracted from 
“exogenous” sources, i.e. on International Finance Corporation reports (factbooks, quarterly 
reviews, and monthly reviews of emerging markets, among others), as well as Bekaert and 
Harvey (1998 and 2004) and various IMF reports. The news reported in these sources have 
been selected based on their country-specific nature and overall economic and political 
importance, and not based on their financial market impact. 
More specifically, the database comprises a broad range of important political and 
economic events such as announcements of new regulations, monetary and fiscal policy 
announcements, the default of a financial institution or the election or resignation of politicians 
in individual EMEs. The database not only covers negative events that drive markets lower, 
but also “positive” news that e.g. indicate better than expected economic growth or the 
announcement of important economic reforms. Given the focus on important idiosyncratic 
events in EMEs, the number of identified shocks is limited to, on average, about 6 to 7 shocks 
per emerging market per year. 
Using daily data over the period 2000-2004, we analyze the transmission of these 
shocks from the 14 EMEs to 15 mature economies’ equity markets —covering the 12 euro 
area countries, the United States, Japan and the UK— plus global equity market returns, as 
well as the intra-regional and extra-regional spillover across EMEs. Thus the analysis based 
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on such identified EME shocks allows a very rich analysis of the transmission of different 
types of shocks, and during tranquil rather than only crises periods. 
The empirical analysis yields a number of striking findings. A first revealing stylized 
fact is that there is a strong correlation between global equity returns and EME shocks even 
when taking a medium-term perspective: the correlation coefficient between quarterly global 
equity returns and the net sum of all EME shocks during that quarter is as high as 70%. While 
this obviously does not necessarily imply causality, it underlines that developments in EMEs 
strongly co-move with those in global equity markets. Turning to the issue of transmission, 
i.e. causality, we find that, on a daily frequency, EME shocks have a significant and sizeable 
effect, inducing on average a 0.3% change in global equity returns on the day a shock 
occurs, and rising to around 0.5% cumulated after 5 days. 
Second, our analysis shows that EME-specific shocks are so important overall for 
global equity returns that their effect is still statistically significant after several weeks. While it 
is difficult to quantify precisely the overall explanatory power of the EME shocks for global 
equity markets, in particular the persistence of the effects stresses the economic relevance 
and systemic importance of emerging markets for global equity markets. 
A third key finding of the paper is that global equity markets react almost as strongly 
to positive EME news as to negative news, with this result being robust across EMEs and 
over time. This underlines that EMEs matter for global financial markets not only during 
crises or other less favorable episodes, but that investors in mature economies also share the 
gains from positive developments in EMEs. 
Finally, there are a number of intriguing cross-country differences: although EME 
equity markets generally react more strongly to shocks in other EMEs of the same region, 
mature economies overall react mostly more strongly to EME shocks than emerging markets 
from other regions. Among mature economies, US equity returns respond much more 
to shocks in Latin America than to those in Emerging European and Asian EMEs, while 
Japanese markets are most sensitive to Asian EMEs. By contrast, euro area and UK markets 
not only show the strongest exposure and overall reaction to EME shocks, but they appear 
to be roughly equally sensitive to shocks from all the three EME regions of Asia, Emerging 
Europe and Latin America. 
Overall, the findings of the paper emphasize the emergence and relevance of EMEs 
for global and in particular mature economies’ financial markets. This is an important result, 
and constitutes the intended contribution of the paper to the literature, as it underlines 
that emerging markets can no longer be considered as a minor player in global financial 
markets that matter only in times of crisis or financial market turbulence. Given the importance 
and ongoing increase of cross-border financial investment as a transmission channel and 
the rapid growth of EMEs as an asset class, the results suggest that EMEs are likely to 
continue becoming an even more important factor for the determination of global asset prices 
in the years to come. 
The paper is organized as follows. We start with a brief review of related literature 
in section 2, before proceeding to a detailed presentation and some stylized facts of our 
dataset in section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical methodology as well as the benchmark 
empirical results for the transmission of EME shocks. Section 5 then discusses various 
extensions to the benchmark model and several robustness tests. Section 6 concludes. 
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2 Related Literature 
The empirical literature has pointed towards a rapidly increasing degree of financial 
market integration, at least over the past decade. In the early 1990s, most evidence 
pointed towards no or little market integration, as shown e.g. by King et al. (1994) who 
find evidence against the null hypothesis of integrated capital markets, or Bekaert and 
Campbell (1995) who only find a partial integration of equity markets, in particular of EMEs, 
based on an international CAPM modeling framework. However, in recent years the evidence 
on financial integration has changed. For instance, Kim et al. (2005) find that the increase in 
stock market integration in Europe over the period 1999-2003 has been significantly driven 
in part, by macroeconomic convergence associated with European Economic and Monetary 
Union. In addition, Albuquerque et al. (2005) point out that increased market integration leads 
to a greater role for worldwide sources of risk. 
For the context of the present paper, we are particularly interested in the evidence of 
financial integration and interdependence of emerging markets. Much of the focus on EMEs 
in this context over the past decade has been on crises and contagion in and their impact on 
mature economies. The definition of contagion is not unanimous and rather controversial. 
Karolyi (2003) observes that the perception of market contagion is not always consistent with 
the empirical evidence. Along these lines, some researchers define contagion as an increase 
in the degree of interdependence, and find that little of such an increase has taken place in 
financial crises of the 1990s [Forbes and Rigobon (2002)]. By contrast, focusing on the 
channels of contagion, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2002) find that financial turbulence in Brazil, 
Russia, and Thailand in the late 1990s spread globally when it affected asset markets in one 
or more of the world's financial centers. 
Similarly, Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999) analyze the sources of the largest daily 
swings in markets during the Asian crisis by testing the impact of news on daily returns, 
and show that large swings affect local and international markets due to herding behavior. 
In the same vein, Baig and Goldfajn (1998) test for contagion during the Asian crisis and 
suggest that there exist discernible patterns of contagion during periods of financial market 
instability when market participants tend to move together across a set of countries. More 
recently, Rigobon (2002) supports the idea that the transmission of shocks was intensified 
during the Russian and the Asian crises, as well as Cappiello et al. (2005) who find that 
co-movements in equity returns tend to increase significantly during crises. 
Concerning the speed of the transmission, the general consensus is that the 
transmission occurs very rapidly and is intensified during crisis periods, as shown in 
Ederington and Lee (1993), Fleming and Remolona (1999), and Andersen et al. (2003). 
These findings are in line with Ehrmann, Fratzscher and Rigobon (2005) who find that there 
are substantial international spillovers, and that the international propagation of shocks 
is strengthened in times of recession. 
A second important strand relevant for the present paper is the transmission of 
macroeconomic shocks. The key argument here is that asset prices are determined 
simultaneously and thus it is difficult to identify which individual markets are the drivers 
of global markets. Several studies have therefore taken macroeconomic announcements or 
news to identify shocks, and to analyze their transmission. The most frequent approach in the 
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literature has been to study the impact of US and/or other developed market economies 
news on global financial markets. Canova (2005) find that US monetary shocks produce 
significant fluctuations in Latin America, but real demand and supply shocks do not. 
Wongswan (2003) finds a large and significant association between emerging-economy 
equity volatility and trading volume and developed-economy macroeconomic announcements 
at short-time horizons. Other studies focusing on the impact of US news on asset prices 
and foreign exchange rates include Andersen et al. (2003), Miniane and Rogers (2003) and 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004). For instance, Andersen et al. (2003) analyze the response 
of the US market on exchange rates and find that the markets react in an asymmetric fashion 
to good and bad news, since bad news cause a greater impact than good news. 
A third strand relevant for the present paper focuses on the role of financial and real 
integration as a determinant of the financial transmission process. For instance, considering 
the linkages among financial markets, Dungey and Martin (2006) provide evidence that cross 
market linkages played a key role during the Asian crisis. In this sense, the consensus in 
the literature is that trade and financial channels are important factors in determining how 
crises are transmitted internationally [Forbes (2004), Eichengreen et al. (1996), Glick and 
Rose (1999), Forbes and Chinn (2004)]. Focusing on the US during tranquil times, Ehrmann 
and Fratzscher (2006) link the strength of the transmission of US monetary policy shocks to 
the underlying asset holdings and find that the degree of global integration of countries is a 
key determinant for the transmission process. 
In summary, the literature has so far primarily concentrated on measuring the degree 
of integration of EMEs into global financial markets or generally on how various EMEs respond 
to external and internal shocks. As to the relevance of EMEs for global financial markets, the 
focus has been on crisis periods and on contagion issues. To our knowledge, there is no 
systematic work so far assessing how important EMEs are as drivers of global financial 
markets overall, and not only during crises episodes. The analysis of this issue constitutes the 
aim of the present paper and its intended contribution to the literature. 
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3 The Data 
A key difficulty with every type of analysis of financial market linkages is identification: as asset 
prices are determined simultaneously, with shocks often triggering reactions of several 
asset prices within minutes, it is difficult to identify the source of asset price movements and 
the corresponding direction of causality. 
We solve this identification issue by using mostly purely exogenous events occurring 
in EMEs. The list of events for each of the 14 EMEs mostly comes from reports by the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the IMF, which have partly been collected and 
summarized by Bekaert and Harvey (1998 and 2004). In most cases these databases do not 
list the exact day, so that we use newswire services to attribute each of the events to that 
particular day when it occurred and was first reported. 
We believe that using these sources helps mitigate the identification problem as 
they are reliable and, importantly, the news reported in these sources have been selected 
based on their country-specific nature and overall economic and political importance, and 
not based on their financial market impact. This selection criterion implies that these news 
are largely exogenous and specific to the identified EMEs. Given the focus on important 
idiosyncratic events in EMEs, the number of identified shocks is limited to, on average, only 
about 6 to 7 shocks per emerging market per year. 
Our database includes economic and political news, and also not only covers 
negative events, but also “positive” news that e.g. indicate better than expected economic 
growth or the announcement of important economic reforms. The shocks to emerging market 
j at time t are coded as follows: 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−
=
shocknegative
shockno
shockpositive
Sjt
1
0
1
 
Annex 1 provides an overview and some specific examples of our database for the 
case of Argentina. The news include events such as announcements of new regulations, 
monetary and fiscal policy announcements, the collapse of a financial institution or the 
election or resignation of a politician in individual EMEs. 
It should be stressed again that the “exogeneity” of the events, or shocks, 
captured by the IFC/IMF database is of fundamental importance for the validity of the 
analysis of the paper. As Annex 1 illustrates for the case of Argentina, most of the news 
indeed appear to be country-specific and exogenous in the sense that their origin is primarily 
a domestic and not a foreign one. Moreover, although some of the news may not come 
entirely unexpected by the markets, at least part of the news and their timing are likely 
to be unanticipated. 
We are also comforted by the fact that the primary source of the data is the IFC and 
the IMF, and their stated purpose is to identify country-specific events that have large 
economic relevance, and not primarily those that have a global market impact. For all these 
arguments, we believe this database provides the best possible identification method for 
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EME-specific shocks in order to conduct our analysis of the impact of EMEs on global equity 
markets. As we will discuss further below, we also include for a set of “global” shocks in order 
to control for a possible correlation of EME shocks with other unrelated global developments. 
As to the country coverage,  the database  covers  14 EMEs, four in Latin 
America —Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico— four in Emerging Europe —Czech Republic, 
Poland, Russia and Turkey— and six in Asia —India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan and 
Thailand, while the time period is 1 January 2000 to 31 July 2004. This list covers most 
of the systemically important EMEs, possibly with the exception of China. Hong Kong and 
Singapore are also not included, partly due to data availability and partly also as they may not 
be considered as emerging markets any longer given their degree of development and also 
financial market depth. 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
Total Positive Negative Total Positive Negative Total Positive Negative
Emerging markets 424 204 220 308 152 156 176 80 96
Latin America: 214 113 101 146 77 69 76 39 37
Argentina 58 24 34 29 11 18 29 13 16
Brazil 39 22 17 34 19 15 5 3 2
Chile 38 22 16 20 14 6 18 8 10
Mexico 92 50 42 67 35 32 25 15 10
Emerging Asia: 152 67 85 99 45 54 55 23 32
India 48 19 29 27 12 15 21 7 14
Indonesia 35 10 25 16 4 12 19 6 13
Korea 40 21 19 19 10 9 21 11 10
Malaysia 21 9 12 12 4 8 9 5 4
Taiwan 31 17 14 20 11 9 11 6 5
Thailand 26 15 11 24 14 10 2 1 1
Emerging Europe: 168 81 87 123 61 62 55 24 31
Czech Republic 28 14 14 15 9 6 13 5 8
Poland 56 30 26 44 24 20 12 6 6
Russia 77 32 45 56 22 34 21 10 11
Turkey 24 13 11 15 8 7 9 3 6
Shocks Economic shocks Political shocks
 
Notes: The table shows the number of news, economic news and political news recorded for each 
country and region. 
Sources: IMF; IFC; Bekaert and Harvey (1998, 2002); Factiva. 
 
Table 1 gives a summary for the distribution of the shocks across EMEs. Overall, 
there are 424 days with shocks for all 14 EMEs over the whole sample period. This 
means that on average each EME had about 15 shocks over the close to 5-year sample 
period, or about 6 to 7 shocks per year. While some countries experience significantly 
more shocks over that period —these are e.g. as expected countries such as Argentina, 
Mexico and Russia— other have experienced very few shocks that are captured. Moreover, 
the shocks can mostly relatively easily be classified as political or economic shocks, and as 
positive or negative shocks. In the few cases where the sign of the news cannot be readily 
identified, we use the direction of the domestic stock market reaction to sign the news. 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the shocks over time, quarter by quarter 
since 2000. The key point of this chart is that both positive and negative shocks are 
distributed relatively equally over time. Hence this underlines that the empirical findings 
are not driven by individual episodes during the sample period. This point is further 
investigated and confirmed in section 4 when analyzing the time variations in the transmission 
of EME shocks. 
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Figure 1:  Distribution of EME shocks over time 
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# negative shocks # positive shocks
Notes: The figure shows the cumulated positive and negative shocks in a quarterly basis. 
 
Equity market returns come from Datastream market price indices. We chose 
Datastream indices as they have a very broad coverage of stocks within individual markets 
and are most readily comparable across countries. Datastream market indices are also 
available for a broad set of countries, thus providing an ideal source for our analysis of equity 
market spillovers. An additional advantage of Datastream indices is that also sectoral indices 
are available. We will go into detail about sectoral spillovers as an extension in section 4.1 
The empirical analysis is based on daily financial market data, using closing quotes of 
the respective national stock markets in local currency. It is important to consider this timing 
issue in the empirical modeling due to the fact that several equity markets do not have an 
overlap in trading times so that e.g. yesterday’s shocks in Latin American EMEs need to be 
used to analyze the effects on Asian markets today. 
A final caveat is the issue of cross-listing of firms as in particular multinational firms 
may be listed in several markets simultaneously. Thus, for instance, a strong reaction of a 
particular market may at least in part reflect such cross-listing. To control for this issue, the 
ideal way would be to exclude foreign cross-listed firms from domestic equity return indices. 
Unfortunately, such data is not available for all of the 14 EMEs and 15 mature markets in our 
sample. A test for those few markets where such information is available, however, suggests 
that the transmission effects from EMEs are affected only moderately. Part of the explanation 
for these limited effects is that cross-listing primarily occurs among mature economies, and 
much less so with EMEs. 
                                                                          
1. However, there are also some potential drawbacks of Datastream indices, such as that for instance IFC equity indices 
may in some instances be of higher quality – see e.g. Sarno and Taylor (1999) for a detailed discussion. However, the 
need for indices that cover a broad set of countries and are directly comparable with one another point to Datastream 
indices as our preferred choice. 
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4 Empirical Results 
This section constitutes the core of the paper, providing the empirical results for the 
transmission of EME shocks to global equity markets. We start with the benchmark model 
and results in section 4.1, discuss their economic relevance (section 4.2) and then present 
several extensions and robustness tests in section 4.3. 
4.1 Methodology 
As the first step of the analysis, we want to measure the transmission of shocks in emerging 
market country j to the equity market of country i. Our benchmark empirical specification 
looks as follows: 
itit
j
jtjiit XSr εδβα +++= ∑
=
14
1
)(  (1) 
which estimates the response of the equity return of country i, rit, to the shocks emanating 
from the 14 EMEs in the sample, Sjt, and to a vector of controls, Xit, such as own 
past returns and day-of-the-week effects. Note that this model is estimated in a panel for 
all 29 countries i in our sample, including a country fixed effect αi. The model thus yields 
transmission coefficients βj for each of the 14 EMEs, which measure the average effects of 
each of the 14 EMEs on the other 29 countries.2 
It is important to emphasize that ideally one would like to control for all other 
relevant factors in the vector of controls Xit which may affect global equity markets, in 
particular “global” shocks. In order to control for such shocks as much as possible, 
we include two sets of proxies for global shocks in the vector of controls Xit. First, we follow 
Andersen et al. (2003) and Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2006) and include 10 of the most 
important US macroeconomic shocks, as measured through the news or unanticipated 
component of US macroeconomic announcement,3 as a proxy for global economic shocks. 
Although these macroeconomic shocks are US-based in nature, they have been shown by in 
the literature to have a substantial effect on global FX and equity markets. 
Second, we include a measure of global risk aversion, measured by the Chicago 
Board Options Exchange’s SPX Volatility Index, which reflects a market estimate of future 
volatility, based on the weighted average of implied volatilities for a wide range of strike prices. 
The rationale for including this proxy for risk aversion is that the strength in the transmission 
may differ over time and may in part depend on the overall risk attitude of investors.4 
An even more general specification of model (1) is one in which we average also 
across all EME source countries of shocks: 
                                                                          
2. Note that we ensure in the estimation that shocks from countries j are excluded when these same countries are 
included as country i in the estimation. 
3. These shocks are the surprise component of the announcements of the 10 US macroeconomic news: monetary 
policy, GDP advance release, industrial production, CPI, retail sales, trade balance, non-farm payroll employment, ISM 
business confidence, consumer confidence, and housing starts. The surprise component of each of these variables is 
calculated as the difference between the announced value and the expected value, where this latter is measured as the 
median expectation from surveys conducted by Money Market Services (MMS) International. 
4. As these are controls and not the focus of this paper, the results for these shocks are not shown in the tables below, 
but are available upon request. Most of the macroeconomic shocks and the risk-aversion proxy are found to exert a 
statistically significant effect on global and most regional equity markets. 
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itit
j
jtiit XSr εδβα +++= ∑
=
14
1
)(  (2) 
so that in this case β measures the average effect of all EME shocks on equity returns. 
Alternatively, instead of obtaining the average response of a number of country returns to 
EME shocks, we extract the effect on each individual equity return rit by estimating for each 
equity return i separately 
itit
j
jtiit XSr εδβα +++= ∑
=
14
1
)(  (3) 
to get the average transmission of all 14 EMEs to equity return rit, or  
itit
j
jtijit XSr εδβα +++= ∑
=
14
1
)(  (4) 
in order to obtain the response of rit to each of the 14 EMEs separately. Note that we use an 
OLS estimator with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) throughout the paper for the 
estimations in order to take account of and to correct for the heteroskedasticity as well as 
the cross-sectional correlation in the data. Using such an estimator is important in order 
to obtain correct variance-covariance matrices as otherwise we would underestimate the true 
standard errors of the coefficients. 
4.2 Benchmark results 
Table 2 shows the benchmark result for models (2) and (3) for a select number of global, 
regional and mature economies’ equity markets. The market reaction of “world” shows the β 
coefficient for model (3) when using the Datastream world market return index. 
The subsequent rows show the response of regional equity market return indices for Latin 
America, Emerging Asia and Emerging Europe, as well as the return indices of the large 
mature markets of the euro area, Japan, UK and the USA. The last row titled “all countries 
(panel)” shows the panel estimates based on model (2), i.e. indicating the average response 
of the 29 equity markets in the sample.5 
Table 2 indicates that global equity returns react by 0.30% on average in response to 
a shock in one of the 14 EMEs. Global returns appear to be most sensitive to shocks in the 
Latin American EMEs, though they also sensitive to shocks in Emerging Asia and in Emerging 
Europe. The panel estimates in the last row are similar in magnitude when all EME shocks are 
taken together, giving a point estimate of 0.32%, though there are different responses from 
the world index to shocks from different regions. 
Looking at the response of mature economies sheds light on these different 
regional effects and provides a number of interesting results. In particular, US, Japanese and 
European markets react very differently to regional EME shocks. US equity markets change 
substantially more in response to Latin American than to Asian or Emerging European 
shocks. By contrast, Japanese markets appear to respond most to Asian shocks, and 
not at all to shocks emanating from Emerging Europe. The euro area and the UK are very 
different again in that their reaction is very similar to shocks from all three EME regions. For  
                                                                          
5. This panel estimate is comparable to the first row of using the world market index itself, only that the 29 countries in 
our sample do not constitute the whole global equity market – though they account for well over 90% of it – and that 
they are “unweighted” in the sense that in the panel regression each equity market return rit has an equal influence on the 
coefficient, i.e. independent of their actual share in global equity market capitalisation. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 20 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0727 
Table 2:  Transmission of EME shocks – all shocks, by region 
 
Event shock to:
Market reaction of: coef. std.err. coef. std.err. coef. std.err. coef. std.err.
World 0.300 *** 0.04 0.362 *** 0.06 0.149 ** 0.07 0.268 *** 0.07
Latin America 0.402 *** 0.06 0.592 *** 0.07 0.101 0.09 0.315 *** 0.10
Emerging Asia 0.302 *** 0.05 0.220 *** 0.07 0.407 *** 0.09 0.234 *** 0.08
Emerging Europe 0.635 *** 0.08 0.400 *** 0.10 0.329 *** 0.13 0.966 *** 0.16
Euro area 0.354 *** 0.06 0.307 *** 0.08 0.278 *** 0.11 0.373 *** 0.10
Japan 0.216 *** 0.07 0.238 *** 0.10 0.212 * 0.12 0.072 0.11
United Kingdom 0.318 *** 0.05 0.315 *** 0.07 0.234 *** 0.10 0.292 *** 0.10
United States 0.328 *** 0.06 0.457 *** 0.08 0.107 0.10 0.271 *** 0.10
All countries (panel) 0.323 *** 0.03 0.274 *** 0.04 0.263 *** 0.04 0.334 *** 0.05
Transmission of EME shocks, all shocks by region
All 14 Latin Emerging Emerging
EMEs America 4 Asia 6 Europe 4
 
Notes: The table shows the transmission coefficients for EME shocks based on models (1)-(4). ***, **, * 
indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels. 
 
instance, euro area and UK markets react substantially more to shocks from Emerging 
Europe than do the United States and Japan. 
A final point relates to the reaction of EME stock markets to shocks in other EMEs. 
Table 2 nicely illustrates that EME equity markets react very strongly to shocks in the own 
region; this is the case for Latin America (0.59%), Asia (0.41%) and Emerging Europe (0.97%). 
However, there are some, though more limited cross-regional spillovers also for EMEs. 
Table 3 shows the full matrix of spillover of the 14 EMEs to the 29 countries, plus the 
regional averages. As for Table 2, the point estimates of the row called “all countries (panel)” 
are based on panel estimates of models (1) and (2), while all other estimates are based on 
individual country regressions of models (3) and (4). 
Table 3 confirms the results of Table 2, only that it provides a much more detailed 
breakdown of the country by country transmission of shocks. For instance, the findings in the 
table confirm that EME spillovers to other EMEs are much stronger within regions than across 
regions, though cross regional spillovers do exist and are sometimes sizeable. 
An additional interesting point of Table 3 is that it shows the breakdown of 
the responses of the 12 euro area countries to EME shocks. Apart from Finland —most likely 
reflecting the technology dependence of the country— the euro area countries with the 
largest overall reaction to EME shocks are France, Netherlands, Germany and Spain, 
i.e. countries that are relatively integrated or exposed both financially and in terms of trade 
to EMEs. The countries with the overall lowest response are Ireland, Luxemburg, Portugal, 
Greece and Austria.6 For many of the euro area countries it is also confirmed that they appear 
to respond about equally to shocks stemming from any of the three EME regions. 
 
                                                                          
6. The finding for Austria appears somewhat surprising, especially given the countries financial exposure to several 
Emerging European countries, though recall that these include only the Czech Republic, Poland, Russia and Turkey in 
our sample. 
   
Table 3:  Transmission of EME shocks – by country 
 
Event shock to:
Market reaction of:
World 0.300 *** 0.362 *** 0.149 ** 0.268 *** 0.151 0.378 *** 0.201 0.520 *** 0.274 *** 0.093 0.101 -0.081 0.246 0.186 0.293 * 0.100 0.260 *** 0.571 ***
Latin America 0.402 *** 0.592 *** 0.101 0.315 *** 0.427 *** 0.952 *** 0.375 ** 0.617 *** 0.305 ** 0.146 0.126 -0.238 -0.010 0.144 0.444 ** 0.064 0.266 *** 0.926 ***
Emerging Asia 0.302 *** 0.220 *** 0.407 *** 0.234 *** 0.092 0.007 0.520 *** 0.317 *** 0.426 *** 0.314 0.676 *** 0.189 0.754 *** 0.389 *** 0.511 *** 0.093 0.175 0.378 *
Emerging Europe 0.635 *** 0.400 *** 0.329 *** 0.966 *** 0.358 * 0.512 ** 0.160 0.388 *** 0.153 0.700 ** 0.224 0.204 0.479 0.182 0.457 0.299 0.933 *** 3.177 ***
Euro area 0.354 *** 0.307 *** 0.278 *** 0.373 *** -0.049 0.397 *** 0.107 0.571 *** 0.115 0.354 * 0.205 -0.049 0.692 *** 0.432 ** 0.502 ** 0.247 0.330 *** 0.543 *
Japan 0.216 *** 0.238 *** 0.212 * 0.072 -0.016 0.047 0.601 *** 0.279 ** 0.197 0.107 0.635 *** 0.587 * 0.056 0.260 -0.062 0.033 0.124 0.048
United Kingdom 0.318 *** 0.315 *** 0.234 *** 0.292 *** 0.109 0.340 ** 0.240 0.471 *** 0.231 0.204 0.081 -0.035 0.500 ** 0.315 * 0.309 0.238 0.331 *** 0.222
United States 0.328 *** 0.457 *** 0.107 0.271 *** 0.254 * 0.526 *** 0.128 0.633 *** 0.394 *** -0.052 -0.099 -0.131 0.104 0.120 0.273 0.051 0.248 *** 0.796 ***
All countries (panel 0.323 *** 0.274 *** 0.263 *** 0.334 *** 0.130 0.273 *** 0.232 *** 0.374 *** 0.180 *** 0.385 *** 0.297 *** 0.111 ** 0.412 *** 0.308 *** 0.396 *** 0.149 *** 0.317 *** 0.728 ***
Latin America:
Argentina 0.377 *** 0.826 *** 0.019 0.062 2.412 *** 0.175 0.449 0.234 0.035 0.280 0.220 0.619 -0.268 -0.402 -0.041 -0.563 * 0.561 *** 0.262
Brazil 0.508 *** 0.642 *** 0.136 0.496 *** 0.405 * 1.419 *** 0.358 0.557 *** 0.353 0.216 0.239 -0.552 0.216 0.120 0.765 ** 0.135 0.393 ** 1.312 **
Chile 0.243 *** 0.348 *** 0.074 0.214 *** 0.008 0.521 *** 0.657 *** 0.369 *** 0.118 0.081 0.066 0.114 0.281 * -0.166 0.315 *** 0.182 0.165 0.452 *
Mexico 0.365 *** 0.651 *** 0.079 0.183 * 0.342 ** 0.742 *** 0.295 * 0.951 *** 0.375 *** 0.035 0.094 -0.102 -0.363 0.368 ** 0.195 -0.028 0.143 0.835 ***
Emerging Asia:
India 0.288 *** 0.082 0.510 *** 0.311 *** -0.511 *** 0.308 0.584 0.195 1.286 *** 0.267 0.513 * -0.223 0.090 0.427 * 0.697 *** -0.006 0.496 *** -0.209
Indonesia 0.311 *** -0.006 0.724 *** 0.235 -0.071 -0.644 ** 0.492 * 0.172 0.461 * 2.236 *** 0.604 ** -0.085 0.370 0.225 -0.125 0.239 0.235 0.382
Korea 0.368 *** 0.292 ** 0.413 ** 0.289 * 0.252 -0.104 0.432 0.483 *** 0.381 0.296 1.577 *** 0.327 0.784 * 0.441 0.764 ** -0.001 0.193 0.683
Malaysia 0.087 * -0.035 0.179 ** 0.131 * -0.124 -0.199 0.191 0.034 0.082 0.255 0.037 0.502 *** 0.312 -0.031 0.078 0.093 0.082 0.355 ***
Taiwan 0.335 *** 0.258 * 0.612 *** 0.137 0.145 -0.115 0.666 * 0.461 *** 0.309 0.067 0.737 *** 0.448 2.094 *** 0.414 0.250 0.054 -0.006 0.685
Thailand 0.231 *** 0.140 0.270 ** 0.264 * -0.148 -0.050 0.596 *** 0.175 -0.102 0.287 0.821 *** 0.445 0.110 1.133 *** 0.449 * 0.211 0.221 0.234
Emerging Europe:
Czech Republic 0.271 *** 0.078 0.285 *** 0.376 *** 0.142 0.142 -0.294 0.118 0.233 0.594 *** 0.290 0.263 0.154 0.153 1.330 *** 0.110 *** 0.315 *** 0.173
Poland 0.444 *** 0.254 *** 0.302 *** 0.576 *** 0.240 0.141 0.290 0.303 ** 0.148 0.389 0.595 *** 0.342 0.109 0.673 *** 0.301 0.957 0.370 *** 0.632 ***
Russia 0.723 *** 0.587 *** 0.400 *** 0.946 *** 0.530 *** 0.865 *** 0.231 0.531 *** 0.451 * 0.579 0.268 0.156 0.768 ** -0.062 0.190 0.120 1.389 *** 1.870 ***
Turkey 0.780 *** 0.300 0.409 1.410 *** 0.259 0.226 0.446 0.265 -0.552 1.184 ** -0.095 0.072 0.879 1.007 1.167 0.420 0.432 7.728 ***
Euro area:
Austria 0.016 -0.063 0.046 0.080 -0.157 0.047 -0.097 -0.087 -0.115 0.174 0.136 -0.070 0.153 0.251 ** 0.187 0.041 0.063 0.108
Belgium 0.211 *** 0.240 *** 0.066 0.220 *** 0.037 0.206 0.148 0.386 *** 0.014 0.187 -0.019 0.017 0.275 0.025 0.444 * 0.200 0.229 * -0.117
Finland 0.616 *** 0.461 *** 0.677 *** 0.524 *** -0.022 0.808 ** -0.088 0.750 *** 0.289 0.823 ** 0.894 *** -0.058 1.500 *** 0.781 * 0.838 * 0.092 0.345 1.626 ***
France 0.376 *** 0.354 *** 0.303 *** 0.355 *** -0.068 0.351 * 0.219 0.683 *** 0.157 0.417 * 0.251 0.033 0.668 ** 0.442 * 0.519 * 0.218 0.307 * 0.443
Germany 0.381 *** 0.356 *** 0.217 * 0.455 *** -0.046 0.513 *** 0.065 0.652 *** 0.106 0.234 0.180 -0.419 0.761 *** 0.469 *** 0.619 ** 0.359 ** 0.364 *** 0.670 ***
Greece 0.203 *** 0.218 *** 0.123 0.243 ** 0.231 0.084 -0.031 0.379 *** 0.141 0.385 0.305 0.107 -0.085 0.181 0.213 0.218 0.362 *** 0.046
Ireland 0.154 *** 0.061 0.147 0.226 *** -0.245 0.264 -0.038 0.230 *** 0.036 0.259 -0.053 0.212 0.263 0.210 0.025 0.140 0.302 0.463
Italy 0.285 *** 0.155 * 0.322 *** 0.334 *** -0.168 0.268 * -0.029 0.397 *** 0.120 0.433 0.021 0.071 0.708 0.392 0.397 0.197 0.341 0.481
Luxemburg 0.109 * 0.017 0.102 0.134 -0.109 0.142 0.018 0.003 -0.181 0.421 -0.299 0.279 0.075 0.088 0.325 0.064 0.328 -0.322
Netherlands 0.358 *** 0.340 *** 0.247 ** 0.362 *** 0.000 0.318 * 0.204 0.637 *** 0.072 0.229 0.173 0.099 0.653 0.467 0.431 0.341 0.333 0.392
Portugal 0.131 *** 0.085 0.122 0.158 ** -0.037 0.108 0.018 0.125 0.077 0.144 0.201 -0.094 0.272 0.203 0.411 0.053 0.158 0.219
Spain 0.327 *** 0.302 *** 0.249 ** 0.321 *** 0.082 0.452 *** -0.068 0.519 *** 0.053 0.428 0.251 0.195 0.473 0.340 0.290 0.192 0.346 0.538
Aggregate Latin America 4 Emerging Asia 6
Brazil India Indonesia MalaysiaEMEs Asia 6 Europe 4
All 14 Emerging Emerging
Mexico Korea Taiwan Thailand
Latin
America 4 Argentina Chile Poland Russia Turkey
Emerging Europe 4
Czech Rep.
 
Notes: The table shows the transmission coefficients for EME shocks based on models (1)-(4). ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels. 
B
A
N
C
O
 D
E
 E
S
P
A
Ñ
A 21 
D
O
C
U
M
E
N
T
O
 D
E
 T
R
A
B
A
JO
 N
.º 0727 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 22 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0727 
Table 4:  Asymmetries of transmission 
Positive versus negative shocks 
 
Event shock to:
Market reaction of: coef. std.err. coef. std.err. coef. std.err. coef. std.err.
World 0.284 *** 0.06 0.272 *** 0.08 -0.008 0.09 0.378 *** 0.10
Latin America 0.446 *** 0.09 0.589 *** 0.10 -0.007 0.14 0.404 *** 0.14
Emerging Asia 0.321 *** 0.07 0.242 *** 0.09 0.338 *** 0.12 0.278 *** 0.11
Emerging Europe 0.802 *** 0.11 0.674 *** 0.13 0.100 0.15 1.108 *** 0.20
Euro area 0.381 *** 0.08 0.285 *** 0.11 0.182 0.15 0.490 *** 0.13
Japan 0.249 *** 0.10 0.304 ** 0.13 0.112 0.18 0.143 0.15
United Kingdom 0.289 *** 0.08 0.288 *** 0.11 0.060 0.12 0.318 *** 0.12
United States 0.299 *** 0.09 0.305 *** 0.12 -0.080 0.13 0.410 *** 0.16
All countries (panel) 0.332 *** 0.04 0.286 *** 0.04 0.132 *** 0.04 0.393 *** 0.06
Event shock to:
Market reaction of: coef. std.err. coef. std.err. coef. std.err. coef. std.err.
World -0.331 *** 0.06 -0.464 *** 0.08 -0.275 *** 0.11 -0.148 0.09
Latin America -0.368 *** 0.08 -0.595 *** 0.11 -0.189 0.13 -0.219 * 0.13
Emerging Asia -0.289 *** 0.08 -0.196 * 0.11 -0.462 *** 0.14 -0.187 0.13
Emerging Europe -0.480 *** 0.12 -0.090 0.16 -0.515 *** 0.21 -0.811 *** 0.23
Euro area -0.338 *** 0.09 -0.332 *** 0.12 -0.354 ** 0.16 -0.245 0.15
Japan -0.181 * 0.11 -0.164 0.17 -0.292 * 0.16 0.005 0.16
United Kingdom -0.361 *** 0.09 -0.346 *** 0.10 -0.373 *** 0.15 -0.264 * 0.15
United States -0.380 *** 0.09 -0.630 *** 0.12 -0.258 * 0.15 -0.121 0.12
All countries (panel) -0.320 *** 0.03 -0.261 *** 0.05 -0.369 *** 0.04 -0.270 *** 0.05
Emerging
Asia 6 Europe 4
EmergingAll 14
EMEs
Latin
America 4
Positive shocks
Negative shocks
EMEs America 4 Asia 6 Europe 4
All 14 Latin Emerging Emerging
 
Notes: The table shows the transmission coefficients for EME shocks based on models (1)-
(4), but further distinguishing between positive and negative shocks. ***, **, * indicate 
statistical significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels. 
 
As the final step of the analysis, we analyze the presence of various asymmetries in 
the transmission process. In particular, we investigate whether negative EME shocks have a 
larger effect than positive one. As discussed above, this hypothesis has been emphasized 
in particular in the literature on financial crises, which frequently suggests that negative EME 
shocks may have a much larger relevance for mature financial markets. Moreover, we also 
compare different types of shocks, i.e. political versus economic shocks. 
Table 4 shows that negative EME shocks only have a slightly larger effect on the 
global equity market index (-0.33%) than positive events (0.28%). This underlines that also 
positive EME developments induce financial spillovers. There are again a number of revealing 
cross-country differences. Japanese and euro area equity markets, for instance, are even 
more responsive to positive shocks than to negative EME events, while the opposite is the 
case for US markets. Another revealing dimension relates to the shocks emanating from 
different EME regions. Negative shocks in Latin America and Asia appear to have a 
significantly larger impact than positive news. By contrast, positive shocks emanating from 
Emerging Europe in all cases have larger spillovers to other regions, including the euro area, 
than negative shocks. 
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Table 5:  Asymmetries of transmission  
Political versus economic shocks 
 
Event shock to:
Market reaction of: coef. std.err. coef. std.err. coef. std.err. coef. std.err.
World 0.291 *** 0.06 0.309 *** 0.09 0.230 ** 0.11 0.260 *** 0.11
Latin America 0.501 *** 0.08 0.629 *** 0.11 0.205 0.13 0.529 *** 0.15
Emerging Asia 0.321 *** 0.08 0.355 *** 0.13 0.390 *** 0.13 0.176 0.15
Emerging Europe 0.445 *** 0.11 0.347 ** 0.17 0.379 * 0.21 0.496 *** 0.19
Euro area 0.257 *** 0.09 0.248 * 0.13 0.204 0.16 0.245 0.18
Japan 0.123 0.10 0.103 0.16 0.143 0.20 0.020 0.16
United Kingdom 0.282 *** 0.08 0.265 *** 0.11 0.235 * 0.14 0.217 0.16
United States 0.367 *** 0.09 0.425 *** 0.12 0.277 0.17 0.328 ** 0.15
All countries (panel) 0.274 *** 0.03 0.266 *** 0.05 0.256 *** 0.04 0.242 *** 0.04
Event shock to:
Market reaction of: coef. std.err. coef. std.err. coef. std.err. coef. std.err.
World 0.288 *** 0.05 0.370 *** 0.07 0.100 0.09 0.261 *** 0.08
Latin America 0.327 *** 0.07 0.534 *** 0.09 0.045 0.12 0.224 * 0.12
Emerging Asia 0.296 *** 0.06 0.164 ** 0.08 0.419 *** 0.12 0.259 *** 0.10
Emerging Europe 0.696 *** 0.10 0.382 *** 0.11 0.300 * 0.17 1.167 *** 0.20
Euro area 0.388 *** 0.07 0.328 *** 0.09 0.312 ** 0.14 0.409 *** 0.12
Japan 0.220 *** 0.08 0.277 ** 0.13 0.239 * 0.13 0.089 0.13
United Kingdom 0.321 *** 0.06 0.317 *** 0.09 0.215 * 0.13 0.325 *** 0.11
United States 0.293 *** 0.07 0.450 *** 0.10 0.012 0.12 0.238 ** 0.12
All countries (panel) 0.333 *** 0.03 0.265 *** 0.04 0.264 *** 0.04 0.373 *** 0.06
EMEs America 4 Asia 6 Europe 4
All 14 Latin Emerging Emerging
Economic shocks
Political shocks
Emerging
Asia 6 Europe 4
EmergingAll 14
EMEs
Latin
America 4
 
Notes: The table shows the transmission coefficients for EME shocks based on models (1)-
(4), but further distinguishing between economic and political shocks. ***, **, * indicate 
statistical significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels. 
 
 
Table 5 distinguishes between economic and political shocks, showing that there is 
no substantial difference in the relevance between these types of shocks. Tables 6.a and 6.b 
then combine the type of news with the direction of the shocks. It appears that in particular 
negative political news have the largest overall impact on foreign equity markets, though in 
general again all categories of shocks have significant spillover effects. 
In summary, we find significant and sizeable spillovers from EMEs to global 
equity markets, with world equity returns responding on average 0.3% to EME shocks. 
The disaggregation of the shocks by source EME and by affected countries shows a 
highly heterogeneous picture, with mature economies being most sensitive to EME shocks 
from their own region, with the exception of Europe which appears to be roughly equally 
responsive to all thee EME regions. 
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Table 6.a:  Asymmetries of transmission 
Positive economic versus negative economic shocks 
 
Event shock to:
Market reaction of: coef. std.err. coef. std.err. coef. std.err. coef. std.err.
World -0.307 *** 0.07 -0.511 *** 0.09 -0.174 0.14 -0.153 0.11
Latin America -0.334 *** 0.10 -0.564 *** 0.13 -0.145 0.17 -0.219 0.16
Emerging Asia -0.279 *** 0.09 -0.148 0.11 -0.486 *** 0.19 -0.202 0.15
Emerging Europe -0.585 *** 0.15 -0.115 0.17 -0.525 * 0.27 -1.085 *** 0.30
Euro area -0.383 *** 0.11 -0.384 *** 0.14 -0.307 0.20 -0.377 ** 0.19
Japan -0.081 0.13 -0.190 0.20 -0.192 0.19 0.157 0.21
United Kingdom -0.386 *** 0.10 -0.412 *** 0.12 -0.240 0.20 -0.434 ** 0.19
United States -0.339 *** 0.10 -0.695 *** 0.14 -0.106 0.18 -0.084 0.14
All countries (panel) 0.334 *** 0.05 0.313 *** 0.04 0.181 *** 0.06 0.370 *** 0.07
Event shock to:
Market reaction of: coef. std.err. coef. std.err. coef. std.err. coef. std.err.
World 0.267 *** 0.08 0.250 ** 0.11 0.008 0.12 0.355 *** 0.12
Latin America 0.316 *** 0.10 0.530 *** 0.13 -0.079 0.17 0.235 0.16
Emerging Asia 0.310 *** 0.08 0.192 * 0.12 0.338 ** 0.16 0.309 *** 0.13
Emerging Europe 0.798 *** 0.14 0.644 *** 0.16 0.021 0.18 1.243 *** 0.27
Euro area 0.391 *** 0.10 0.286 ** 0.14 0.319 0.21 0.438 *** 0.15
Japan 0.353 *** 0.11 0.362 ** 0.17 0.298 0.19 0.299 * 0.17
United Kingdom 0.256 *** 0.09 0.239 * 0.13 0.185 0.17 0.235 * 0.14
United States 0.245 ** 0.11 0.237 0.15 -0.105 0.16 0.373 ** 0.19
All countries (panel) -0.327 *** 0.04 -0.273 *** 0.07 -0.327 *** 0.05 -0.323 *** 0.06
Negative economic shocks
Positive economic shocks
Emerging
Asia 6 Europe 4
EmergingAll 14
EMEs
Latin
America 4
All 14 Latin Emerging Emerging
EMEs America 4 Asia 6 Europe 4
 
Notes: The table shows the transmission coefficients for EME shocks based on models (1)-
(4), but further distinguishing between positive economic and negative economic shocks. ***, 
**, * indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels. 
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Table 6.b:  Asymmetries of transmission  
Positive political versus negative political shocks 
 
Event shock to:
Market reaction of: coef. std.err. coef. std.err. coef. std.err. coef. std.err.
World 0.222 *** 0.08 0.260 ** 0.12 -0.011 0.14 0.365 *** 0.14
Latin America 0.592 *** 0.12 0.682 *** 0.14 0.132 0.23 0.795 *** 0.23
Emerging Asia 0.285 *** 0.10 0.314 ** 0.14 0.338 * 0.19 0.186 0.18
Emerging Europe 0.507 *** 0.13 0.604 *** 0.20 0.256 0.26 0.571 *** 0.13
Euro area 0.244 ** 0.12 0.221 0.17 -0.039 0.21 0.527 *** 0.20
Japan -0.050 0.14 0.101 0.20 -0.188 0.32 -0.244 0.22
United Kingdom 0.270 *** 0.11 0.310 * 0.16 -0.122 0.15 0.460 *** 0.19
United States 0.286 *** 0.12 0.379 ** 0.17 -0.003 0.19 0.422 * 0.22
All countries (panel) 0.251 *** 0.05 0.282 *** 0.07 0.098 * 0.05 0.326 *** 0.07
Event shock to:
Market reaction of: coef. std.err. coef. std.err. coef. std.err. coef. std.err.
World -0.353 *** 0.10 -0.399 *** 0.14 -0.413 *** 0.16 -0.176 0.18
Latin America -0.410 *** 0.11 -0.609 *** 0.17 -0.260 0.17 -0.304 0.20
Emerging Asia -0.350 *** 0.13 -0.418 * 0.23 -0.431 *** 0.18 -0.173 0.23
Emerging Europe -0.376 ** 0.19 -0.067 0.28 -0.472 0.30 -0.461 0.36
Euro area -0.263 * 0.15 -0.309 0.21 -0.389 * 0.23 -0.009 0.29
Japan -0.284 * 0.16 -0.128 0.27 -0.393 0.26 -0.250 0.22
United Kingdom -0.290 ** 0.13 -0.236 0.17 -0.508 *** 0.20 -0.014 0.26
United States -0.438 *** 0.13 -0.518 *** 0.19 -0.490 ** 0.25 -0.252 0.22
All countries (panel) -0.291 *** 0.03 -0.268 *** 0.04 -0.375 *** 0.05 -0.179 *** 0.05
Negative political shocks
Positive political shocks
Emerging
Asia 6 Europe 4
EmergingAll 14
EMEs
Latin
America 4
All 14 Latin Emerging Emerging
EMEs America 4 Asia 6 Europe 4
 
Notes: The table shows the transmission coefficients for EME shocks based on models (1)-
(4), but further distinguishing between positive political and negative political shocks. ***, **, * 
indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels. 
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5 Sensitivity 
As a final step, this section presents various extensions and robustness checks (section 5.2) 
and discusses the overall economic relevance of EMEs shocks for global equity markets 
(section 5.1). 
5.1 Economic relevance of EMEs for global equity markets 
How permanent and long-lasting are the effects of EME shocks on global equity markets? 
This is an important question because a key issue of interest is not only whether the effect 
of EMEs on global financial markets is statistically significant, but also whether it is 
economically relevant. From a more general perspective, EME events may have a statistically 
significant effect on global equity markets on a particular day, but they may in the medium- to 
long-run —e.g. over several weeks or months— be dominated by other developments, like 
economic and political developments in mature economies, such that EMEs may play only a 
small overall role for global equity markets. 
This issue is hard to tackle because our data includes only a small, albeit relevant 
fraction of EME events that affects global financial markets. In other words, our data includes 
only “shocks”, i.e. well identified, mostly unanticipated events while many other unanticipated 
or anticipated EME developments are clearly not captured by our data. This means that it is 
impossible to determine precisely how much of global equity market movements are 
explained by developments in EMEs and how much by mature economies or truly common 
shocks. 
As a first test in order to gauge the overall relevance of EME shocks for 
global markets, an interesting stylized fact is to plot the “net” number of shocks per  
quarter —subtracting the total number of negative shocks from the total number of 
positive shocks across all 14 EMEs— together with the global equity market return during 
that quarter. Figure 2 shows a remarkably high degree of comovement between both, in 
particular since the end of 2002. In fact, the correlation coefficient between the two series 
is 0.70 for the whole sample period. It should be stressed that while this obviously does not 
necessarily imply causality, it underlines that developments in EMEs strongly co-move 
with those in global equity markets. While this is merely indicative of the overall importance 
of EMEs, it appears to be a striking stylized fact of the data. 
Given this limitation, and in order to turn to a more formal test, we can gauge the 
importance of EMEs for global equity markets also by analyzing the permanence of 
the transmission of EME shocks. The intuition is as follows: if EMEs are an important driver 
of global equity markets and if our data captures relevant EME events, then the impact of our 
EME shocks on global equity markets should be detectable in the data at least for several 
days or even weeks. We test for this permanence in two alternative ways. First, we estimate 
a dynamic version of model (3) by including and testing for the lagged effects of EME shocks: 
itit
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with k as the number of lags. Figure 3 shows the cumulated coefficients up to 3 months 
(65 days), while testing the null hypothesis ∑
=
=
K
k
kH
0
0 0: β , for the returns of the world equity 
index, as well as for the United States’, the euro area’ and the emerging markets’ 
equity indices. The key finding is that there is a high degree of persistence or permanence in 
the spillover effects of EME shocks. For the world, US and euro area indices the effect 
increases for a number of days after a shock occurs and then stabilizes. Most importantly, 
statistically the impact of EME shocks is mostly significant even still after 1 month, or about 
20 business days. This is somewhat less the case for the US equity markets, but for which 
the effects of EME shocks are still statistically significant for up to 10 days, or 2 weeks. 
Figure 2:  EME shocks and global equity returns – 3-months cumulated 
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Notes: The figure shows the cumulated net shocks (cumulated difference between positive 
and negative shocks) and the cumulated stock market return in a quarterly basis. 
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Figure 3:  Shock transmission to World, US, Euro Area and EMEs – cumulated dynamic effects up to 3 months (65 days) 
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Notes: The figure is based on model (5) and shows the cumulated coefficients up to k days, testing the null hypothesis ∑
=
=
K
k
kH
0
0 0: β , for the returns of the world equity index, as 
well as for the United States’, the euro area’ and the emerging markets’ equity indices. The dotted lines show the 90% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 4:  Shock transmission to World, US, Euro Area and EMEs – data frequency up to 3 months (65 days) 
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Notes: The figure is based on model (3) for different data frequencies ranging from 1 day to 65 days, showing the transmission coefficient β for the returns of the world equity index, 
as well as for the United States’, the euro area’ and the emerging markets’ equity indices. The dotted lines show the 90% confidence intervals. 
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A second and alternative way of testing for the permanence of the effects is to 
use different data frequencies. For this exercise, we repeat the estimation of model (3) using 
different data frequencies starting with daily data (as in the benchmark model), then moving to 
two-day frequencies and so on up to using 65-day or quarterly frequency. Figure 4 gives the 
results again for four of the equity market indices. This second exercise gives us essentially 
the same results as the first one: the effect of EME shocks appears to increase slightly in the 
first few days and then levels off. Again, the key result is that the effect of EME shocks on 
global equity markets is present in the data even when using quarterly data. Both of the tests 
underline the overall economic importance of EMEs for global equity markets. 
5.2 Extensions and robustness 
We now turn to various extensions and robustness tests of the benchmark results. A first 
important issue is that of time-variations in the transmission process. Do EMEs matter 
for global equity markets only in some periods rather than others? As discussed above, much 
of the literature appears to indirectly or directly suggest that EMEs have the largest impact on 
global markets during financial crises. Recall that our sample period of 2000-2004 had 
no major EME crisis of systemic importance, especially when compared to the Latin American 
crisis of 1994-95, the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, or the Russian default and the LTCM 
episode in the second half of 1998. Nevertheless, the Argentine default of late 2001 and the 
Turkish crisis of 2001 were two relevant events during our sample period. 
To test for the presence of time variations in the transmission process, we modify 
the benchmark models (2) and (3) to allow for different spillover coefficients for each of the five 
years of our data:7 
itit
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with Dt = 1 for a particular year, and Dt=0 otherwise, so that in this case βt measures the 
average effect of all EME shocks on global equity returns in year t.  
Figure 5 plots the coefficients for the panel estimation of model (6). The figure shows 
a slight decrease in the effects, indicating that the strongest transmission of shocks from 
EMEs to global equity markets occurred in 2000 and 2001, while the smallest effects are 
recorded for 2003 and 2004. However, it should be stressed that the transmission is 
statistically significant and sizeable for all years. Hence EME shocks have continuously 
exerted an influence on global equity markets throughout the sample period, amid relatively 
small variations in the precise magnitude of the transmission.8 
 
                                                                          
7. Note that using a higher frequency, such as quarterly or even monthly data, is not feasible due to the relative few EME 
shocks in our dataset at such frequencies. 
8. Note that this pattern of the time variations in the spillover coefficients is not driven by some specific markets’ 
responses, as it is very similar also when looking only at mature economies. 
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Figure 5: Asymmetry of shock transmission – changes over time 
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Notes: The figure is based on model (6) estimated with annual dummies. 
 
Turning to a second important issue, it is possible that the cross-country difference 
in the transmission process, as highlighted in Table 3, may in part be explained by the very 
different sector composition of countries’ equity indices. Some sectors, such as the financial 
or technology sectors may be more open and exposed to foreign developments. Hence 
countries’ stronger reaction to EME shocks may partly reflect the fact that different sectors 
have different weights in individual countries’ equity indices. For instance, the fact that Spain 
is affected relatively strongly by shocks in Latin America may be explained e.g. by the fact 
that it is highly integrated financially with many Latin American economies but it could also 
be due to the fact that Spain’s equity market index is dominated by some sectors rather 
than others. 
 
Table 7:  Extension – financial sector 
 
Event shock to:
Market reaction of: coef. std.err. coef. std.err. coef. std.err. coef. std.err.
World 0.269 *** 0.04 0.226 *** 0.06 0.202 *** 0.08 0.271 *** 0.07
Latin America 0.415 *** 0.06 0.562 *** 0.09 0.188 * 0.10 0.259 *** 0.10
Emerging Asia 0.227 *** 0.05 0.095 0.07 0.297 *** 0.09 0.306 *** 0.08
Emerging Europe 0.550 *** 0.10 0.255 ** 0.12 0.344 ** 0.18 0.900 *** 0.19
Euro area 0.269 *** 0.06 0.161 * 0.09 0.252 ** 0.12 0.324 *** 0.10
Japan 0.200 ** 0.09 0.147 0.13 0.207 0.15 0.143 0.14
United Kingdom 0.297 *** 0.06 0.224 *** 0.09 0.271 ** 0.12 0.294 *** 0.11
United States 0.322 *** 0.06 0.330 *** 0.09 0.172 0.11 0.295 *** 0.11
All countries (panel) 0.277 *** 0.03 0.183 *** 0.05 0.253 *** 0.05 0.327 *** 0.05
All 14 Latin Emerging Emerging
EMEs America 4 Asia 6 Europe 4
 
Notes: The table shows the transmission coefficients for EME shocks based on models (1)-(4), focusing 
only on the Datastream financial sector return indices. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 
95%, and 90% levels. 
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Given the relevance of financial institutions in the transmission process, an obvious 
hypothesis is that countries where financial institutions are relatively important and constitute 
a large share of the equity index also respond more strongly to EME shocks. We test this 
by re-estimating models (2) and (3) using Datastream financial sector sub-indices. Table 7 
reveals that we can broadly reject this hypothesis as financial sector returns are generally not 
more sensitive to EME shocks than the market index as whole (see Table 2). In fact, the 
overall effect of EME shocks on global financial sector returns is with 0.269% somewhat 
lower than the impact on the overall market index. 
 
Table 8:  Extension – “important” shocks 
 
Event shock to:
Market reaction of: coef. std.err. coef. std.err. coef. std.err. coef. std.err.
World 0.496 *** 0.06 0.684 *** 0.09 0.323 *** 0.09 0.422 *** 0.10
Latin America 0.715 *** 0.08 1.141 *** 0.12 0.359 *** 0.12 0.525 *** 0.14
Emerging Asia 0.542 *** 0.08 0.395 *** 0.13 0.903 *** 0.15 0.383 *** 0.13
Emerging Europe 1.120 *** 0.14 0.701 *** 0.20 0.658 *** 0.18 1.795 *** 0.27
Euro area 0.618 *** 0.08 0.629 *** 0.12 0.558 *** 0.14 0.626 *** 0.14
Japan 0.320 *** 0.10 0.345 ** 0.17 0.440 *** 0.17 0.170 0.17
United Kingdom 0.586 *** 0.08 0.590 *** 0.12 0.544 *** 0.12 0.583 *** 0.13
United States 0.534 *** 0.09 0.905 *** 0.13 0.189 0.14 0.426 *** 0.14
All countries (panel) 0.573 *** 0.06 0.570 *** 0.08 0.538 *** 0.08 0.572 *** 0.10
All 14 Latin Emerging Emerging
EMEs America 4 Asia 6 Europe 4
 
Notes: The table shows the transmission coefficients for EME shocks based on models (1)-(4), focusing 
on “important” shocks, i.e. only on those news that moved the domestic equity market by 1% or more. 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels. 
 
Third and finally, we want to check the effect of large and important shocks, and 
thus restrict the sample to those news that triggered a significant domestic market 
movement. To determine the threshold, we choose a 1% cut-off, although we conducted 
robustness tests for the 0.5% and 1.5% cut-offs. We do this to check how the results of the 
benchmark model change when using a narrower set of shocks. The corresponding 
Table 8 however, shows that this is not the case and that most spillover coefficients 
increase significantly for this narrower sample. Indeed, the increase in the magnitude 
of the transmission is consistent with the argument that news that have a larger effect on 
the domestic market should also have a greater impact on other markets. 
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6 Conclusions 
How important are emerging markets as drivers of global financial markets? While there is a 
large literature and plenty of evidence for the role and impact of EMEs during financial crises, 
much less attention has been paid to the systemic importance of global financial markets 
overall, including during “normal” or tranquil times. In fact, the last few years have been 
marked by the absence of major crises or systemic turbulence in EMEs as well as the strong 
emergence, or re-emergence, of EMEs as a key asset class for investors in mature 
economies. 
This paper has focused on the importance of EMEs for global financial markets by 
analyzing the transmission of EME shocks to global equity markets. Our database for this 
analysis has the key advantage of containing largely exogenous shocks that are specific to 
individual emerging economies. We have estimated the transmission of these shocks to 29 
mature economies and emerging markets and find that EME shocks have a statistically and 
economically significant impact on global equity markets. On average, shocks to the 14 EMEs 
in our sample move world equity markets by 0.3% on the day they occur. Importantly, the 
persistence of these effects is found to be remarkably long as the impact of EME shocks is 
statistically significant even one month after they occur. Moreover, EMEs influence global 
equity markets not just in “bad” times but also in “good” times. In fact, the average effect of 
positive shocks stemming from EMEs is in many cases very similar to that of negative events. 
A second key result of the paper is that we detect a large degree of heterogeneity 
in the response of individual countries’ equity markets to EME shocks. For mature 
economies, US equity markets appear to be more sensitive to developments in Latin America 
than in Emerging Asia or Emerging Europe, while the Japanese market reacts the 
strongest to shocks elsewhere in Asia. By contrast, an interesting finding is that European 
(euro area and UK) equity markets appear to be different as they are exposed the strongest 
and also roughly equally responsive to shocks in all three emerging market regions. 
Overall, the findings underline the importance of emerging markets as drivers of 
global asset price developments in recent years. In many ways, this is what one would expect 
given the substantial contribution of EMEs to global economic growth and their rapidly 
increasing clout in global financial markets as investors. Understanding the evolution of EMEs 
as a global player in financial markets is an important topic from a financial market angle, but 
also from a policy perspective given their rapid emergence and the rising economic 
interdependence between mature and emerging market economies. 
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Appendix 
Annex 1:  Data description and examples 
Date* News
24 February 2000 A strike is called against the labor market reform proposal, stipulating 
decentralization of collective labor contracts.
10 March 2000 IMF Board approves Stand-By Arrangement with Argentina.
6 June 2000 A national strike is called.
17 August 2000 Responding to public denunciations, President De La Rúa creates a special 
commission, chaired by Vice PresidentCarlos Álvarez, to investigate the bribery 
charges associated with the Senate approval of the labor reform law.
6 October 2000 Vice President Carlos Álvarez resigns.
5 March 2001 Ricardo López Murphy is appointed Minister of Economy.
29 March 2001 Minister Cavallo secures “emergency powers” from Congress.
16 April 2001 Minister Cavallo announces a modification of the convertibility law, with the 
replacement of the dollar by an equallyweighted basket of the dollar and the euro.
26 April 2001 The Central Bank Governor is replaced over alleged money laundering charges.
8 May 2001 A national strike is called against the labor reform.
11 July 2001 Standard & Poor’s lowers Argentina’s long-term sovereign rating further from B+ 
to B.
21 August 2001 A zero deficit plan is announced, with a mandatory reduction in expenditures to 
balance the budget.
3 December 2001 IMF announces planned augmentation of Stand-By Arrangement by $8 billion.
6 December 2001 The government introduces a partial deposit freeze (corralito) and capital controls.
10 December 2001 Minister Cavallo travels to the United States to meet with IMF management.
19 December 2001 Minister Cavallo resigns.
20 December 2001 President Fernando De La Rúa resigns over death of demonstrators. Ramón Puerta, 
President of the Senate, becomes interim President.
3 January 2002 President Duhalde announces the end of convertibility, and the introduction of a 
dual foreign exchange regime.
7 January 2002 The convertibility law ceases to be in effect. A dual exchange rate regime is 
introduced, one fixed at 1.40 pesos to a dollar for foreign trade, and the other 
determined in the free market.
8 March 2002 The pesoization of government debt under Argentine law is decreed.
5 March 2003 The Supreme Court ruled that conversion to pesos was illegal. According to the 
Central Bank, approximately to 8,760 million US dollars are at stake. a17
10 September 2003 Argentine finance officials reached an agreement with the IMF for a three-year, 
US$ 12.6 billion stand-by credit. Under the terms of the new arrangement, the 
government pledges to raise the consolidated primary fiscal surplus
14 June 2004 Roberto Lavagna sent a "fiscal responsibility" bill to Congress to set limits on 
spending by provincial governments.
2 July 2004 Argentina obtained regulatory approval in the U.S. for a debt exchange to 
restructure some $100 billion in defaulted debt.
Source: Factiva, Datastream Bekaert and Campbell (2004) and Independent Evaluation Office,  
International Monetary Fund (2004). The IMF and Argentina, 1991–2001.  
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